According to the World Bank, it appears that while some developing countries managed to balance their checkbooks despite the worldwide economic downturn, the struggle continues for wealthier countries to decrease their debt. In the United States, our external debt to GDP ratio has increased from 84.1% in 2006, to 100.2% in 2012. In comparison, Portugal's external debt to GDP ratio is the highest among all the countries measured. From 2006 to 2012, their debt ratio increased from 189.0% to 228.9%. Greece has the second highest ratio but endured the largest increase in the debt ratio. In 2006, the World Bank estimated that their debt ratio stood at 125.8%. By 2012, it exploded by more than 80% to 206.4%. France has the third highest debt ratio, 190.8%, followed by Germany at 170.4%, Spain at 169.7%, Italy at 118.9%, and then the United States at 100.2%.
Interestingly, despite the struggles of developed countries to stabilize their debt, developing countries continue to enjoy low levels of external debt to GDP ratios. China's ratio stood at 9.5%, followed by 17.2% for Brazil, 18% for India, 27% for Mexico, 29.3% for Russia, and 41.3% for Turkey.
Can Obama's second term outperform his first?
On President Obama’s inauguration day for his second term, the Economist explores the economic performance of two-term presidents since the start of the 20th century. A range of sources measured performance according to industrial production, federal debt, GDP, stock market, household income, unemployment rate, and real house prices. The overall score of each president’s second term decreases by an average of 4.2 percentage points from their first term score.
Don’t write off Obama’s second term yet, though. Franklin Roosevelt’s highly successful New Deal policies in his first term led to a substantially lower relative second term, and three of the eleven two-term presidents (including most recent Democratic president Bill Clinton) had higher economic performances in their second terms.
How would you solve the debt crisis?
With all of the controversy regarding the United States' debt, several sites have released games that allow people to try their own hands in debt balancing. Specifically, the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget released the interactive tool seen in the graphic. Choose when to phase out troops from Afghanistan and Iraq, whether or not to pursue a moon colony, and how to treat retirees. The site displays savings relative to current policy dependent upon the policies you choose.
The Wall Street Journal released a similar activity, allowing you to choose between "fiscal cliff" scenarios, extending current legislation, or adopting new measures of your own. The decisions one makes influence whether or not the United States debt would make it to 60% of GDP in 2020, as some policymakers and experts have suggested.
The Wall Street Journal released a similar activity, allowing you to choose between "fiscal cliff" scenarios, extending current legislation, or adopting new measures of your own. The decisions one makes influence whether or not the United States debt would make it to 60% of GDP in 2020, as some policymakers and experts have suggested.
Consumer Sentiment, Job Creation Could Suffer if Congress Fails to Reach a Deal
According to a White House report cited in the WashingtonPost, if Congress fails to reach a deal that would renew for the Bush-era tax cuts for middle class Americans, the economy may suffer. Among other consequences, consumer spending could plunge by $200 billion dollars, since middle-class Americans may become reluctant to spend if they are forced to pay $2,200 more in taxes. Consumer sentiment could also take a hit. Although 2007 marked the highest level in consumer sentiment, it declined rapidly in the summer of 2011 during the negotiations over the debt ceiling. Consumer sentiment has recovered since then and currently, it stands at its highest level in over 5 years. However, the Council of Economic Advisers warns that the fear of the “fiscal cliff” could drive down consumer sentiment and consumer spending. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) also seems to concur with some of the findings of the Council of Economic Advisers, mainly that an extension of middle-class tax cuts could provide a much-needed boost to the economy. The CBO estimates that such an extension would result in a 1.3% increase in GDP and could help add up to 1.6 million jobs. Currently, it appears that negotiations are at a standstill. Although in recent days some top Republicans said they were willing to break Norquist's anti-tax pledge, Republicans and Democrats have not reached a deal to avoid the major spending cuts and tax increases that are set to take effect in 2013.
Mixed GDP Prospects for the Eurozone
According to a recent interactive chart by The Economist, problems surrounding the euro have eased since restructuring took place. Spearheaded by the president of the European Central Bank, the ECB has, under specific conditions, purchased short-term bonds from countries that were facing economic decline. Countries that were facing severe economic decline have seen gains, notably in the area of current-account deficits turning to surpluses in Ireland. Also quite positive, Spain and Portugal's current-account deficits have been lessened.
Government debt is still a subject for concern in the peripheral countries of the Eurozone, with Portugal, Ireland, and Italy having governmental debt at over 100% of their GDP. Greece is in the deepest debt, with government debt at 175% of the Greece's GDP. Another area for future progress is within the increased gap between the countries within the Eurozone that are doing the lending and those that are on the recipient end of those loans; Germany's GDP will grow this year, while Greece's will fall, adding another year to its six of recession.
Government debt is still a subject for concern in the peripheral countries of the Eurozone, with Portugal, Ireland, and Italy having governmental debt at over 100% of their GDP. Greece is in the deepest debt, with government debt at 175% of the Greece's GDP. Another area for future progress is within the increased gap between the countries within the Eurozone that are doing the lending and those that are on the recipient end of those loans; Germany's GDP will grow this year, while Greece's will fall, adding another year to its six of recession.
U.S. Department of Commerce Reports Large Decrease in American Durable Goods
The Department of Commerce released its monthly report on Durable Goods Manufacturers' Shipments this past Thursday. In August 2012, new orders for manufactured durable goods fell $30.1 billion (13.2%) to $198.5 billion. This decrease represents the most severe drop since January of 2009. While the durable goods report is highly volatile and not representative of the economy on the whole, it does provide insight into the performance of manufacturers that produce high value-added goods such as cars, turbines, semiconductor equipment, computer products, and electrical equipment. Additionally, the Census utilizes the report in its Gross Domestic Product estimates. American durable goods manufacturers had previously enjoyed three consecutive months of increases, and the over $230 billion value of shipments in July 2012 marked the first time the figure had recovered to pre-recession levels. The drastic 13.2% reduction, while not necessarily the best indicator of long-term trends, can be utilized to make short-term earnings predictions regarding the industries represented in the report. An important note regarding this report: civilian aircraft orders fell significantly, and burdened the overall figure. Orders for nondefense capital goods excluding aircraft increased 1.1% in August, and this important portion of the report is a good barometer of American business; thus, despite the 13.2% overall drop, many manufacturers did in fact experience a healthy increase in orders.
Health Spending Represents 17.9% of GDP
The California Health Care Foundation recently released its 2012 report on health care costs. The report illustrates how America pays for its health care, as well as how these costs have evolved over the past half-century. In 1960, health spending represented just 5.2% of GDP. By 2010, that proportion ballooned to 17.9%. Per capita spending has experienced an even more dramatic increase. In 2000, health spending per capita was $4,878, but after just a decade, that figure rose to $8,402. Compared to other countries, the U.S. spends far more on health care both per capita and as a percentage of its GDP. Switzerland’s $5,270 spent on health care per capita makes the nation a distant second to the U.S. in health spending. Over the past 50 years, the question of who foots the health care bill has constantly changed. In 1960, the bulk of health care funds came from out-of-pocket spending. Today, however, government programs like Medicare and Medicaid along with private insurance cover the majority of costs, and hospital care, physician and clinical services, and prescription drugs all necessitate far less out-of-pocket spending. For instance, in 1960, nearly all of the money for prescription drug costs (96%) came from the consumers’ pockets. In 2010, out-of-pocket spending accounted for just 19% of the expenditures.
Brookings Institution Finds Economic Recovery in Metro Areas to be Sluggish and Uneven
The Brookings Institution released its July Metro Monitor, in which the organization inspects key economic indicators from each of America’s 100 largest metropolitan areas in order to assess the national recovery. The findings point towards a sluggish recovery. Since the fourth quarter of the previous year, employment among the U.S.’s most populated regions rose 0.5%, unemployment fell 0.3%, GDP grew 0.6%, and housing prices decreased 2.1%. Brookings points out diminishing GDP growth and meager job numbers as the most troubling indicators.
Texas metro areas, due to a booming natural gas sector, experienced a more mild recession, and have thus pulled out of the downturn better than most regions. High-tech metro areas such as Boston, Raleigh, San Jose, and Seattle have benefited from stabilization in housing prices, while on the other hand the majority of metro areas in the west have performed poorly.Why price inflation in developed countries is systematically underestimated
Following several posts in this blog, I've compiled a paper (link to a complete pdf version):
Why price inflation in developed countries is systematically underestimated
Abstract
There is an extensive historical dataset on real GDP per capita prepared by Angus Maddison. This dataset covers the period since 1870 with continuous annual estimates in developed countries. All time series for individual economies have a clear structural break between 1940 and 1950. The behavior before 1940 and after 1950 can be accurately (R2 from 0.7 to 0.99) approximated by linear time trends. The corresponding slopes of regressions lines before and after the break differ by a factor of 4 (Switzerland) to 19 (Spain). We have extrapolated the early trends into the second interval and obtained much lower estimates of real GDP per capita in 2011: from 2.4 (Switzerland) to 5.0 (Japan) times smaller than the current levels. When the current linear trends are extrapolated into the past, they intercept the zero line between 1908 (Switzerland) and 1944 (Japan). There is likely an internal conflict between the estimating procedures before 1940 and after 1950. A reasonable explanation of the discrepancy is that the GDP deflator in developed countries has been highly underestimated since 1950. In the USA, the GDP deflator is underestimated by a factor of 1.4. This is exactly the ratio of the interest rate controlled by the Federal Reserve and the rate of inflation. Hence, the Federal Reserve actually retains its interest rate at the level of true price inflation when corrected for the bias in the GDP deflator.
Why price inflation in developed countries is systematically underestimated
Abstract
There is an extensive historical dataset on real GDP per capita prepared by Angus Maddison. This dataset covers the period since 1870 with continuous annual estimates in developed countries. All time series for individual economies have a clear structural break between 1940 and 1950. The behavior before 1940 and after 1950 can be accurately (R2 from 0.7 to 0.99) approximated by linear time trends. The corresponding slopes of regressions lines before and after the break differ by a factor of 4 (Switzerland) to 19 (Spain). We have extrapolated the early trends into the second interval and obtained much lower estimates of real GDP per capita in 2011: from 2.4 (Switzerland) to 5.0 (Japan) times smaller than the current levels. When the current linear trends are extrapolated into the past, they intercept the zero line between 1908 (Switzerland) and 1944 (Japan). There is likely an internal conflict between the estimating procedures before 1940 and after 1950. A reasonable explanation of the discrepancy is that the GDP deflator in developed countries has been highly underestimated since 1950. In the USA, the GDP deflator is underestimated by a factor of 1.4. This is exactly the ratio of the interest rate controlled by the Federal Reserve and the rate of inflation. Hence, the Federal Reserve actually retains its interest rate at the level of true price inflation when corrected for the bias in the GDP deflator.
Real GDP per capita since 1870
We've just finished and published a working paper. The reader may want to download it from the MPRA: Real GDP per capita since 1870
Key words: GDP, model, economic growth, inertia, trend, OECD
Abstract
The growth rate of real GDP per capita in the biggest OECD countries is represented as a sum of two components – a steadily decreasing trend and fluctuations related to the change in some specific age population. The long term trend in the growth rate is modelled by an inverse function of real GDP per capita with a constant numerator. This numerator is equivalent to a constant annual increment of real GDP per capita. For the most advanced economies, the GDP estimates between 1950 and 2007 have shown very weak and statistically insignificant linear trends (both positive and negative) in the annual increment. The fluctuations around relevant mean increments are characterized by practically normal distribution. For many countries, there exist historical estimates of real GDP since 1870. These estimates extend the time span of our analysis together with a few new estimates from 2008 to 2011. There are severe structural breaks in the corresponding time series between 1940 and 1950, with the slope of linear regression increasing by a factor of 4.0 (Switzerland) to 22.1 (Spain). Therefore, the GDP estimates before 1940 and after 1950 have been analysed separately. All findings of the original study are validated by the newly available data. The most important is that all slopes (except that for Australia after 1950) of the regression lines obtained for the annual increments of real GDP per capita are small and statistically insignificant, i.e. one cannot reject the null hypothesis of a zero slope and thus constant increment. Hence the growth in real GDP per capita is a linear one since 1870 with a break in slope between 1940 and 1950.
Key words: GDP, model, economic growth, inertia, trend, OECD
South Korea to Surpass Japan's GDP per Person
Although Japan was once the foremost nation in terms of economic growth, the Economist's daily chart suggests that this trend is changing. Countries like South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, who used to trail behind Japan in regards to GDP per person, are now quickly outpacing Japan. Even more remarkable, South Korea is expected to achieve a higher GDP per person measured at purchasing-power than Japan within five years. Singapore outpaced Japan in this category in 1993 and Taiwan passed Japan in 2010. However, the case of South Korea will be extraordinary, give that 32 years ago South Korea’s GDP per person was roughly a fourth of Japan’s.
Internet Economy Expected To Grow Rapidly
As the world enters the information age, and the Internet continues to assimilate into the everyday lives of billions of people, the question begs: how impactful is the Internet to the economy? The Economist has released a graph based on a recent report from the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) detailing the Internet’s contribution to the economies of the G20 countries. The Internet economy in Britain is now larger than its construction and education sectors, comprising over 8% of GDP and forecasted to amount to over 12% by 2016. BCG predicts that the Internet economy will grow at more than 10% annually, and by 2016, will comprise 5.3% of GDP in the G20 nations. BCG also notes that as of now, the European Union has not capitalized on Internet revenues due to a lack of a single, all-encompassing digital market.
GDP Growth Predictions Indicate Sluggish Recovery, but Possible Return to Form In 2013 For Some Economies
Two more graphs on GDP in the USA
Two more graphs on real GDP in the USA. In the forth quarter of 2011, the level of real GDP was higher ($13,422 .4 billion) than that in the fourth quarter of 2007 ($13,326 billion) as Figure 1 shows. Figure 2 demonstrates that the increasing population did not allow real GDP per capita t reach the level of 2007: $42,727 vs. $43,791. In seems to be the task for 2012 to 2014 if no recession will occur.
Figure 1. Real GDP
Figure 2. Real GDP per capita
Real GDP and GDP deflator in 2011
Here are some quick notes on the new estimates of real GDP and GDP deflator for 2011. Figurer 1 shows the rate of growth of real GDP, dlnGDP/dt, at annual and quarterly basis. In 2011, the rate is 0.017 1/y, i.e. 1.7% per year, despite the rate growth in the fourth quarter of 2.7% (SAAR). Previously, we predicted a small recession in 2012 and 2013. This prediction will be updated soon when the 2010 census results are published and incorporated into the so called postcensal population estimates.
Figure 2 shows the growth of total population for the purpose of per head calculations. Please notice a large step in population between 1999 and 2000 as associated with the error of closure, i.e. the difference between intercensal estimate for 2000 and the number enumerated in the 2000 census. Figure 3 presents the rate of growth of real GDP per capita , dlnG/dt. In 2011, the rate of growth was 0.0098 1/y. This means that the total increase in population was of 0.7%.
Figure 4 shows the GDP deflator or price inflation associated with the economy as a whole. This is the most comprehensive measure of inflation as we discussed many times in this blog. For 2011, the GDP deflator is 2.1%. This is larger than we predicted but the last quarter signals about upcoming deflation, as we foresaw six years ago. Currently, the FRB also foresees very low inflation rates through 2014.
According to our concept of GDP growth, real GDP per capita has a inertial component which is expressed in a constant annual increment, dG=const. Figure 5 updates the graph showing the evolution of real GDP per capita in the USA. One can observe a gradual return to the constant level of annual increment. This works as inertial movement in physics. However, one can expect some more years of dG less than average, dG<$490 (2011 US dollars). It is worth noting, that there is no output gap when real GDP per cpaita is considered. The evolution of dG exactly follows it long term trend and the years after 2007 serve to return dG to the trend from its highs in the late 1990s.
We have to notice that the estimates of the nominal GDP and GDP deflator are subject to revision which may be as high as several per cent (+2.1% for 2001). However, the long term trends in all presented variables fit our concept and predictions.
Figure 1. The growth rate of real GDP: annual and quarterly (annualized). MA(4) for the quarterly time series. For 2011, dlnGDP/dt=0.017 1/y.
Figure 2. The evolution of total resident population. Notice the jump between 1999 and 2000 – the closure error.
Figure 3. The growth rate of real GDP per capita. For 2011, the rate is (dlnG/dt=) 0.0098 1/y.
Figure 4. Annual and quarterly (annualized) price deflator of GDP. In the last quarter of 2011 the GDP deflator dropped to 0.004 1/y. This is likely a turn to deflation.
Figure 5. The increment of real GDP per capita since 1950. As predicted, the trend returns to a zero slope. There is no output gap.
Real real GDP
We have already reported that real GDP in the United States is biased by the change in definition of the GDP deflator around 1978. (According to “Concepts and Methods of the U.S. NIPA” the growth rate of real GDP is the growth rate of nominal GDP reduced by the overall change in prices as expressed by the GDP deflator or the economy-wide price index.) Figure 1 shows that before 1978 the GDP deflator and CPI were similar and their difference is negligible since 1929. In 1978, a new definition of the GDP deflator was introduced and the curves coinciding before 1978 started to deviate. In 2010, the deviation was approximately 20%.
A reasonable assumption on the new definition of the GDP deflator is that it should also be applied to the time series before 1978. This would reduce the bias introduced in the time series around 1978. Figure 1 demonstrates (dashed line) that the growth rate of the CPI after 1978 is approximately 20% higher that the rate of the GDP deflator growth. Without loss of generality, one may assume that the GDP deflator had been growing at a rate approximately 20% lower than the CPI before 1978. In Figure 1, green line represents the GDP deflator before 1978. Since the growth rate of the GDP deflator was lower the over all change between 1929 and 2010 is also smaller than that of the CPI.
The difference between the GDP deflator and CPI has an immediate consequence as related to real GDP. When applied to the real GDP estimates published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the corrected GDP deflator provides a more accurate time series. One must use this corrected time series in economics and econometric research in order to avoid the apparent bias.
To begin with, we have updated our comparison of real GDP and real GDP per capita growth. This comparison has demonstrated that the fall in real GDP (recession) has actually returned the growth trajectory to the long-term trend and there is no output gap as estimated from real GDP time series. Figure 2 depicts two old and two new (corrected) curves. One can see that the new curves are above the old ones since the corrected GDP deflator is lower than the CPI and the updated real GDP estimates are higher than the original estimates. The corrected real GDP curve implies a much larger output gap that makes this hypothesis truly void. Essentially, the growth rate between 1930 and 1960 was so high that it can never be repeated. As a result, the Solow model (constant returns to scale) behind the output gap is likely to be wrong.
Figure 1. Cumulative growth rate (the sum of annual inflation rates) of various definitions of inflation since 1929.
Figure 2. Old and corrected (corr.) estimates of real GDP and real GDP per capita. The former estimates are below the new ones.
Update 28.10.2011. Corrected table of real GDP per capita and real GDP in 2005 US $
2010 42270 13108145194
2009 41377 12722814211
2008 43242 13181625195
2007 43791 13225891467
2006 43399 12978410715
2005 42681 12643309646
2004 41792 12265967955
2003 40769 11857542216
2002 40108 11556298822
2001 39769 11347579296
2000 39750 11226180266
1999 38592 10779826176
1998 37238 10283422652
1997 36102 9854329716
1996 34977 9433786578
1995 34112 9093849856
1994 33671 8870793305
1993 32747 8523454654
1992 32255 8287019110
1991 31614 8015097420
1990 32112 8033812272
1989 31877 7885955399
1988 31069 7613800209
1987 30115 7313216945
1986 29443 7086429569
1985 28717 6849176802
1984 27823 6577190262
1983 26186 6136243938
1982 25282 5870935476
1981 26030 5987108240
1980 25640 5838894640
1979 26010 5855007060
1978 25503 5677707387
1977 24150 5320037949
1976 23103 5038386795
1975 21814 4711459533
1974 21689 4639185468
1973 21796 4619427179
1972 20696 4344618556
1971 19729 4097469291
1970 19161 3929633433
1969 19185 3889478681
1968 18673 3748418138
1967 17905 3558699243
1966 17580 3456136296
1965 16656 3237016460
1964 15817 3035727724
1963 15129 2864008171
1962 14684 2739924324
1961 14039 2579516585
1960 13910 2514340896
1959 13838 2451111168
1958 13078 2277479719
1957 13353 2287102029
1956 13298 2237003680
1955 13280 2194815712
1954 12594 2045223652
1953 12885 2055915430
1952 12487 1959856824
1951 12096 1866190324
1950 11400 1729138416
1949 10677 1592940944
1948 10795 1582831140
1947 10309 1485823522
1946 10482 1482021159
1945 11855 1658907921
1944 12093 1673619102
1943 11231 1535740268
1942 9643 1300405392
1941 8175 1090577563
1940 7044 930616096
1939 6542 857231031
1938 6120 795393311
1937 6356 819695449
1936 6072 778270922
1935 5389 686317930
1934 4963 627750020
1933 4535 570028178
1932 4683 585161480
1931 5488 681318834
1930 5933 730845272
1929 6562 799800744
Real GDP is NOT correct
This is an extension of the story on wrong metrology of macroeconomic measurements. Economics chiefly fails and produces a great amount of counterproductive work due to wrong measurements of basic macroeconomics variables. In our previous post we focused on real GDP in the US and here we extend the case by Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. As mentioned before, we have devoted enough efforts to reveal and recover many trivial cases in our book “mecħanomics. Economic as Classical Mechanics”.
Real GDP (see Concepts and Methods of the U.S. NIPA for details) is the difference between nominal GDP and the GDP deflator (price index). The latter is not easy to calculate or even evaluate. In this post, we found that it is so much a sophisticated problem that before 1978 there was no practical difference between the cumulative inflation values of the CPI and the GDP deflator in the US, as Figure 1 demonstrates. (The cumulative inflation, i.e. the cumulative sum of inflation rates, is different from price index when differently calibrated in the beginning.) Effectively, the curves in the Figure diverge from 1978. There is no direct statement about the reasons of the change in definitions in the aforementioned conceptual document, but we might guess that this is likely related to the introduction of a new methodology to evaluate the overall price inflation. This difference has affected our analysis of Okun’s law and forced the introduction of a structural break in 1978 in the dependence between unemployment (and employment) rate and the rate of real economic growth. As we lately reported, this was an artificial break completely related to the change in real GDP definition in 1978.
Thus, before 1978 the CPI was used to estimate of the overall price inflation. Since 1978, the GDP deflator has been used. The difference between these two variables can not be neglected: the cumulative change in inflation between 1978 and 2009 is 20 percentage points. This implies that when applied to the estimates before 1978, the concept of the dGDP would result in a bigger change in real GDP estimates. The overall real GDP increase since 1929 should be much larger in the current definition of the GDP deflator is applied.
To validate this finding we have borrowed data from the OECD and calculated the CPI and dGDP cumulative inflation in Australia, Canada and the UK, as shown in Figure 2. There are clear breaks in different years: for Australia in 1983 (also 1983 was estimated from a structural break in Okun’s law); for Canada – 1980 (1982 was estimated from a structural break in Okun’s law); for the UK – 1979 (1982 was estimated from a structural break in Okun’s law). For the UK, the CPI and dGDP curves start to diverge in 1979 but the pace of deviation is very slow and the year of structural break in Okun’s law is hard to determine accurately.
One can conclude that all structural breaks in the previously estimated models of the rate of unemployment (Okun’s law) and the employment/population ratio for the US, Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom were entirely artificial and forced by the change in real GDP definition in the years of these breaks. (The OECD does not provide sufficient data length for other modeled countries and we need to find other sources of information for France, Japan and Spain.) Hence, real GPD estimates are incompatible over the break years and thus wrong. One must not use them for modeling and statistical analysis.
Real GDP is NOT correct!
Figure 1. Cumulative rate (the sum of annual inflation rates, what is different from inflation index) of inflation in the United States since 1929, as described by the CPI and dGDP.
Figure 2. Same as in Figure 1 for Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom.
















